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A B S T R A C T
Health systems around the world face ﬁnancial pressures that can aﬀect sustainability and patient outcomes, and
there is a vast literature devoted to the allocation of scarce health care resources. Capital spending - for example
on estates, equipment and information technology - is an important but often neglected area of this literature.
This study explores the constraints on the allocation of capital budgets in health care, before addressing the
question: what is the role of priority setting and rationing in responses to these constraints? The paper presents
ﬁndings from interviews conducted with senior ﬁnance professionals in 30 National Health Service local pro-
vider organisations across England. Findings suggest a pervasive sense of impending crisis, with capital re-
strictions limiting investment in buildings, infrastructure and equipment. The paper applies a conceptual clas-
siﬁcation scheme from the classic rationing literature (the forms of rationing framework) and identiﬁes
widespread practices of ‘selection’, ‘dilution’ and ‘delay’, with ‘denial’ and ‘termination’ comparatively rare.
Practices of ‘deﬂection’ and ‘deterrence’ are ascribed to national actors as a means of restricting the ﬂow of
capital resources to the system. The study suggests that there is little by way of tailored support for priority
setting in capital spending, and a perception that decisions are often reactive and short term. It also suggests that
wider system features and dynamics can preclude or constrain priority setting at the organisational level. The
authors use these ﬁndings to suggest future conceptual development of the forms of rationing framework and
make recommendations for research and practice in this area.
1. Introduction
All governments grapple with the challenge of providing health care
that is both aﬀordable and of high quality. As a result, tools and ap-
proaches associated with evidence based policy decision-making have
spread, albeit unevenly, across the world (Chalkidou et al., 2009;
Löblová, 2016). Whereas the aspiration for many lower and middle
income countries is to extend coverage, so that the costs of care are not
borne disproportionately by patients, in countries where universal
coverage is assumed, the preoccupation is with improving outcomes,
reducing variation and curtailing spending increases (Barasa et al.,
2017a; Husøy et al., 2018; Ratcliﬀe et al., 2017; Williams, 2011). De-
ciding how to allocate budgets across treatment options and patient
groups is commonly referred to as ‘priority setting’, and such decisions
are taken at multiple system levels. The term priority setting is often
contrasted with ‘rationing’ which refers to the eﬀects of limit setting
decisions, for example on patients (Klein, 2010). Whereas the reasons
for setting priorities are explicit, rationing is more likely to be conducted
implicitly and/or by clinicians at the ‘bedside’ (Danis et al., 2014). The
priority setting literature is vast, and contains prescription from ethics
and economics, as well as analysis from the critical social sciences
(Landwehr and Klinnert, 2015; Williams, 2013). Furthermore, priority
setting is increasingly present in the national apparatus of health sys-
tems, where the rhetoric at least is of promoting equity, clinical eﬀec-
tiveness and eﬃciency (Baltussen et al., 2017). However, research
suggests that local resource allocation processes continue to be marked
by high levels of implicit rationing (Crompton et al., 2017; Hall et al.,
2018; Robinson et al., 2011).
The sheer volume of policy and research dedicated to priority set-
ting is perhaps not surprising given the problems posed by deﬁcits in
health care funding. However, the focus has typically been on services,
treatments and therapies, with other areas such as workforce and in-
frastructure underrepresented (Kuhlmann and Larsen, 2015). For ex-
ample, spending on equipment is somewhat marginal in the priority
setting literature, with even less attention paid to physical infra-
structure and information technology (IT) (Diaconu et al., 2017; Rechel
et al., 2009; Tarricone et al., 2017). We therefore know relatively little
about how capital funding decisions are taken, and the extent to which
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T
priority setting and rationing feature in these. This is problematic, not
only because capital budgets constitute a signiﬁcant element of health
care spending, but also because they are often subject to constraint or
retrenchment. Furthermore, the capital investment decision-making
function itself is often notably under-resourced (Braithwaite, 2018).
This paper explores the constraints on the allocation of capital
budgets in health care, before addressing the question: what is the role
of priority setting and rationing in responses to these constraints? The
relevant elements of the current literature are ﬁrst summarised and
considered in relation to capital spending. We then describe methods
and results from an interview study carried out in the English National
Health Service (NHS). We use these ﬁndings to suggest future devel-
opment of the forms of rationing framework and to make re-
commendations for research and practice.
2. Understanding priority setting and rationing
Three broad debates dominate the priority setting and rationing
literature. The ﬁrst concerns the contested claim that rationing is in-
evitable, and that priority setting is therefore desirable (Light and
Hughes, 2001). The second relates to how priority setting should be
performed, and the third concerns how priority setting – and rationing –
take place in reality. Our concern in this paper is primarily with the
third of these questions, i.e. whether and in what ways priority setting
and rationing are enacted in practice. We give primacy to this question
as the inevitability or otherwise of budget limits in health is beyond the
scope of this paper to adjudicate. Further, we believe any normative
prescription for decision-making should proceed from an empirically-
informed understanding of the current experience, and that context is
an important mediator of normative prescriptions for decision-making.
Many extant priority setting methodologies promote either decision
analysis, stakeholder deliberation or combinations of these two.
However, the evidence suggests that the realities of resource allocation
often diverge from these rational ideals (Bentley et al., 2018; Gibson
et al., 2005; Jansen et al., 2018). The role of contextual factors is
central to this discrepancy. For example, system incentives and con-
straints have been shown consistently to inﬂuence the success or failure
of priority setting, irrespective of the method adopted (Barasa et al.,
2017b; Hipgrave et al., 2014; Petricca et al., 2018; Smith et al., 2016;
Williams et al., 2018). In the often highly charged atmosphere of health
care limit setting, reactions from the public and stakeholders cannot be
inferred from, for example, surveys of social value preferences (Gu
et al., 2015). Similarly, oﬃcial statements of organisation mission and
purpose rarely correspond with the unstable and sometimes hostile
realities into which priority setting programmes are pitched (Smith
et al., 2014). Overall then, analysis of how rationing takes place in
practice suggests that institutions, interests and politics retain primacy
over evidence, procedural justice, democracy and ethics in shaping
processes and outcomes (Harlock et al., 2018; Harris et al., 2017;
Williams, 2015).
This discrepancy between the ought and the is of rationing means
that frameworks are required to help interpret resource allocation in
practice. We refer to perhaps the most common of these in this paper as
the ‘forms of rationing’ (FoR) framework (Scrivens, 1979). This was
initially adapted to the health care context by scholars of the NHS in the
United Kingdom (Hunter, 1993; Klein et al., 1996; New, 1996). Early
versions comprised of four implicit forms of rationing: ‘delay’ in the
delivery of care; ‘dilution’ of care quality; ‘deﬂection’ to other sources of
care, and; ‘deterrence’ from accessing services. Descriptions of these
forms were initially grounded in the experiences of patients at the coal-
face of health care delivery (see Table 1). Subsequently, explicit forms
were added, including: ‘denial’ of services, ‘selection’ between inter-
ventions and patient groups, and ‘termination’ of provision. These were
more frequently expressed as decisions made at system or population
levels.
This process of piecemeal development and accrual has resulted in
divergences of presentation, with authors adopting diﬀerent combina-
tions of forms and deﬁning them in diﬀerent ways (Hunter, 1993;
Owen-Smith et al., 2015; Petrou and Wolstenholme, 2000). As well as
this, there is no expectation that the various forms present in similar
degree or frequency, as Klein (2010, 389–90) notes:
‘The most visible, and politically sensitive, forms are denial and delay: a
refusal to prescribe a particular drug and making patients queue on the
waiting list. But the most pervasive form of rationing is the least explicit
and least visible: rationing by dilution. Decisions at the coal face of
healthcare delivery – not to order an expensive diagnostic test, say, not to
make a specialist referral or to reduce ward staﬃng levels in order to
balance the budget – normally attract little attention unless they explode
into a scandal.’
Although some validation of the FoR framework can be inferred
from the frequency of its application, and the apparently all-encom-
passing range of its categories, in its current form it is a purely classi-
ﬁcatory framework, and therefore unconnected to wider theories of
decision-making and welfare. Furthermore, whilst it has been used to
describe the rationing of services and interventions, it remains to be seen
whether it might also be applied to capital spending in areas such as
equipment, IT and the built environment. Hypothetically, one might
apply the categories of ‘denial’ and ‘selection’ to explicit decisions to
refuse or restrict options for capital investment, and ‘termination’ to
divestment of physical assets and the services housed within them.
Investing in inferior equipment or partial upgrades might be a form of
‘dilution’, and postponing renewal or investment an example of ‘delay’.
The forms that capital rationing by ‘deﬂection’ and ‘deterrence’ might
take are less immediately evident but might include diverting clients to
capital resources in other sectors, or measures to make capital invest-
ment unattractive or unrewarding.
3. Research setting
The English NHS contains a mixed economy of health care provi-
ders, which includes traditional NHS ‘Trusts’ alongside ‘Foundation
Trusts’ which have greater ﬁnancial autonomy whilst still being ac-
countable to the NHS. In 2017, these Trusts and Foundation Trusts
include 152 acute, 54 mental health, 17 community and 10 ambulance.
Many mental health and community trusts have merged into partner-
ship trusts. There are also numerous not-for-proﬁt independent sector
providers and thousands of self-employed general practitioners (NHS
Confederation, 2017). These providers are ‘commissioned’ by local
Clinical Commissioning Groups (n= 207) and national bodies to de-
liver services for patients. Like systems across the world, the English
NHS is facing well-documented challenges as it seeks to reconcile high
levels of demand with a limited overall funding allocation (Lafond
et al., 2016). Forty three percent of NHS trusts forecast a deﬁcit for the
period 2017/18 and there is a recognition across the system that dif-
ﬁcult decisions are required over spending in all areas (Murray et al.,
2017).
One area aﬀected by these pressures is capital spending, deﬁned
here as investment in the acquisition, maintenance or upgrading of
physical assets including equipment, technology and buildings. Capital
decisions in the English NHS have been subject to increasing national
control in recent times as the Department of Health and Social Care
(DHSC) has sought to keep within the expenditure envelope allocated to
it by Parliament. NHS provider organisations are subject to a capital
resource limit and require approval of a ‘business case’ for any new
capital project. Although Foundation Trusts can ﬁnance capital pro-
grammes through internally generated funds, many currently ﬁnd
themselves in ﬁnancial deﬁcit, which also makes securing loans more
diﬃcult. Many organisations are therefore reliant on centrally held
funds. However, these have become scarcer as the DHSC has transferred
monies from its capital to revenue budgets (Healthcare Financial
Management Association, 2018). This has led to claims of a ‘high risk’
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maintenance backlog of £962.5 million in 2016/17 (Edwards, 2017)
and an overall estimated £5bn backlog maintenance bill (Health
Foundation, 2017).
The eﬀects of this on local improvement strategies, clinical targets
and patient outcomes is unclear. Despite the overall capital funding
regime – in which national public funds have become more scarce and
local sources of revenue less accessible – local organisations are subject
to deﬁcit reduction targets and ﬁnancial control totals in relation to
capital spending, as well as being required to improve and integrate
services (NHS England/NHS Improvement, 2018). To meet these tar-
gets, they are encouraged to ‘maximise opportunities for self-funding of
schemes using their own capital and receipts from land disposals and …
private ﬁnance where this provides value for money’ (NHS England/
NHS Improvement 2018, 7). In order to better understand this experi-
ence, the primary focus for this study is set at this organisational level.
4. Methods
This study sought to explore the role of priority setting and ra-
tioning in provider organisations’ responses to constraints placed on
their capital budgets. It follows a semi-structured interview-based de-
sign to enable open inquiry and follow up questioning in what is a new
area of research (Creswell, 2007). This approach facilitates exploration
of both the extent and nature of priority setting and rationing, as well as
how senior decision-makers understand their role in the resource allo-
cation process (Alvesson, 2003; Kvale, 1996). In this way, we aimed to
build appropriate theoretical constructs, identify the locus for possible
future naturalistic enquiry (e.g. through case study and observation of
decision-making), and contribute to the construction of concepts for
future investigation (Eisenhardt, 1989).
4.1. Sampling
Our approach to sampling was guided by the objectives of meeting
study aims, and ensuring validity in the content and interpretation of
ﬁndings (Patton, 2015). Each NHS Trust and Foundation Trust has a
board made up of the Chair, non-executive directors and executive di-
rectors, of which one will be the Chief Finance Oﬃcer (CFO) (or Di-
rector of Finance). Typically, the CFO is required to be expert in capital
investment appraisal, and oversees the capital programme as well as
setting capital and revenue budgets (Healthcare Financial Management
Association, 2017). Our target interview population was CFOs in NHS
provider organisations, as it was anticipated that these would be best
placed to provide both a reliable account of internal decision-making
processes and an appreciation of how national contextual factors shape
these. Within the sample, we sought to cover all major regions of
England and the main types of NHS provider organisation (including
both Foundation and non-Foundation Trusts). At the outset, our pro-
visional aim was to interview CFOs at approximately 20 separate or-
ganisations, as this would enable coverage of all organisational cate-
gories and regions. After conducting the minimum number of
interviews to ensure these points of variation were covered (n=12),
we checked for data saturation, setting our ‘stopping criteria’ at three
further interviews with no new substantial themes identiﬁed (Francis
et al., 2010).
During this process we extended the sample to include CFOs from
other organisations (ambulance trusts, a national body, and a Clinical
Commissioning Group), and as well as other relevant roles such as
‘Chief Operations Oﬃcer’ and ‘Head of Estates.’ As saturation checks
could not be performed on these sub-sample groups, we treated them as
‘exceptional cases’ enabling us to challenge and critique interpretations
deriving from the wider sample (Gibbs et al., 2007). Our ﬁnal sample
included 30 respondents from 30 separate NHS provider organisations
(see Table 2), including 24 male and six female.
Table 1
The seven forms of rationing.
Form Patient-level deﬁnition System-level deﬁnition Implicit/
explicit
1. Deterrence Costs which may deter patients from seeking care, e.g. distance,
poor information and hostile staﬀ or environment (Harrison and
Hunter, 1994).
Similar to patient-level deﬁnition but also including broader system
policies such as co-payments and demand management.
Implicit
2. Deﬂection ‘Directing would-be beneﬁciaries to alternatives other than those
oﬀered by the health facility, hence saving the resources’
(Kapiriri and Martin, 2007, 45).
Policies to deﬂect demand to other areas of the system, e.g. across health
and social care (Petrou and Wolstenholme, 2000).
Implicit
3. Dilution Reducing standards to cope with demands, ‘services are spread
thinly to ensure everyone gets something’ (Hunter, 1993, 11).
System decisions to lower the quality of services, e.g. reduced time with
patients, reduced use of certain tests or employing less qualiﬁed staﬀ
(Garpenby, 2003).
Implicit
4. Delay ‘Discouraging would-be beneﬁciaries from accessing services
through long waiting time’ (Kapiriri and Martin, 2007, 45).
As patient-level deﬁnition. Implicit
5. Denial ‘Would-be beneﬁciaries … are turned away on the grounds that
they are not suitable or their needs are not urgent enough’ (Klein
et al., 1996, 11).
Exclusion of services from the healthcare system or withholding from
patient groups (Petrou and Wolstenholme, 2000).
Explicit
6. Selection ‘Service providers select those … would-be beneﬁciaries who are
most likely to beneﬁt from intervention’ (Klein et al., 1996, 11).
‘choosing among diseases, interventions, technologies, or patients’
(Garpenby, 2003, 10).
Explicit
7. Termination ‘withdrawal of beneﬁcial treatment from a patient’ (Kapiriri and
Martin, 2007, 45).
Although not formally deﬁned at system level, Petrou and Wolstenholme
(2000, 35) deﬁne this as ‘the deliberate cessation of care … without the




Sample characteristics of interviewees, by role, organisational type and geo-
graphy.
Organisation type Ambulance Trusts (including 1 Foundation Trust) 2
Community/Partnership Trusts (incl. 2 FT) 9
Mental Health and Learning Disability Trusts (incl. 3
FT)
5
Acute Trusts (incl. 10 FT) 12
Clinical Commissioning Group 1
National level – integrated care initiative 1




Role Chief Finance Oﬃcer 20
Deputy/Assistant/Associate FO 5
Chief Operations Oﬃcer 3
Head of Estates 1
Head of Capital Development 1
Total 30
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4.2. Data collection
We sent invitation emails to a sample of CFOs across the three re-
gions. Where necessary to ﬁll organisational or geographical gaps, the
sample was extended to Deputy and Associate Finance Oﬃcers. We sent
a reminder email to all non-responders and approximately 200 in-
dividuals were invited in total. Of those that responded but declined to
take part, nearly all cited lack of available time.
Interviews were semi-structured with pre-set, open-ended questions
and probes that the research team modiﬁed following piloting with two
CFOs drawn from our networks. Questions related to perceptions of and
responses to scarcity and the impact of these as well as, where appro-
priate, to priority setting and rationing in capital spending. Interviews
began with general contextualising questions (e.g. role and organisa-
tional setting) before moving on to the substantive topic. Interviewees
were also encouraged to reﬂect on their own identities and roles as
senior ﬁnance professionals.
We obtained ethical approval from the University of Birmingham
Research Ethics Committee (ERN_13–1085P), and project meetings in-
volved regular reporting and discussion of ethical issues and challenges,
including avoiding harm, informed consent (based on full disclosure of
research intent), respecting privacy and anonymity, and relationships
between researchers and participants. All respondents received an in-
formation sheet explaining the study, and their right to withdraw. All
30 respondents opted for a telephone interview format, which has been
found to be acceptable and valid in work-based studies of this kind
(Sturges and Hanrahan, 2004). Three members of the research team
conducted the interviews, with emphasis placed on building rapport,
maintaining ﬂow, and minimising interviewer bias (Shensul et al.,
1999). Interviews took place between January and April 2018 and
ranged between 18 and 120min in length (average length 32min).
4.3. Data analysis
All interviews were audio-recorded with interviewee consent, and
data were prepared and anonymised before importation into NVIVO
(Version 11). Data were analysed inductively, with initial descriptive
codes developed, applied and discussed by the research team following
independent coding of a subset of transcripts (Burnard et al., 2008).
Codes were then organised into broader themes (i.e. ﬁndings of interest
and relevance across the dataset), and full coding carried out in-
dependently, with checking and matching conducted at the end of this
process. The ﬁnal coding structure and themes enabled us to devise
provisional explanatory accounts, which the research team then dis-
cussed and revised (Bazeley, 2009). Throughout the analysis process,
we looked for negative cases and used these to challenge our devel-
oping explanations – for example by giving particular attention to the
small number of respondents who reported relatively little constraint on
their capital spending. We considered initial explanatory accounts in
the light of the literature on scarcity, priority setting and rationing in
order to assess the study's wider implications in these ﬁelds (Patton,
2015). The following sections present data using summary accounts and
illustrative use of quotation (Pratt, 2009).
5. Findings
5.1. Role of the directors of ﬁnance
Interviewees described their role in terms of ﬁnancial stewardship,
i.e. ensuring the organisation is ‘eﬃcient’ and ‘productive’, meeting
ﬁnancial ‘duties’ and advising on ﬁnancial ‘probity’. However, many
also emphasized the requirement for them to adjudicate between other
organisation imperatives including strategic priorities, patient experi-
ence, workforce and legal compliance. This sense of ‘looking after the
basics’ whilst also facilitating the organisations strategic plans pervaded
responses, and many interviewee sought to dispel the traditional view
of the CFO as someone who ‘stops money being spent’. Instead, they
described themselves as part of the collective governance of the orga-
nisation.
The Finance Director needs to absolutely understand the business and to
make the connections between ﬁnance, information, and activity, per-
formance. And to really sort of bring it together and be in a position to be
able to tell the story about exactly what's going on. (Interviewee 13,
Mental Health Trust CFO)
All respondents spoke freely and apparently authoritatively about
their recent and planned capital spending programmes. On occasion,
respondents requested that speciﬁc comments – mainly relating to their
interactions with national government bodies – remain unreported.
Overall, capital investment was characterised as a neglected domain of
strategic planning and resource allocation, which suﬀered from a lack
of professionalization and proﬁle when compared to more directly
service-related roles and functions. For example, some interviewees felt
that the indirect relationship between capital programmes and mea-
surable clinical outcomes aﬀected the proﬁle and the importance at-
tached to their work.
It's always the poor relation, you know, estates and facilities is absolutely
the Cinderella service, and Ambulance Trust estate is even worse because
it's not patient-facing so it's often the last thing to be thought about.
(Interviewee 30, Ambulance Trust Estates Director)
5.2. Financial pressures
Respondents all agreed that developments at the national level –
speciﬁcally, perceived barriers to timely release of centrally held funds -
had aﬀected the availability of funds for capital programmes.
Those surpluses are not there to allow us to replenish our cash, to con-
tinue to invest in capital going forward. And for the foreseeable future, I
can't see those surpluses coming back, given the state of NHS funds.
(Interviewee 14, Mental Health FT CFO)
Unable to increase revenue-generating activity or secure loans,
many had sought alternative means of raising funds or sharing costs,
including through: private ﬁnance partnerships; leasing; charitable
donations, and; asset sales. The majority of respondents, including
those organisations in relatively good ﬁnancial health, had reduced
their planning horizons and scaled back capital plans.
What we would like to do is centralise down to one or two sites [but] we
just can't do it because we haven't got the money, the capital, to do that.
(Interviewee 26, Acute FT CFO)
In interviews, there was a pervasive sense of inevitable and im-
pending crisis, as capital restrictions limited spending on buildings, IT
and equipment. This, in turn, was seen as aﬀecting eﬃciency, im-
provement, and the range, quality and safety of services. Large-scale
transformation plans were seen as particularly diﬃcult to achieve, with
major capital works delayed or eﬀectively abandoned in favour of more
urgent projects. Almost all respondents stated that eﬃciency and pro-
ductivity were compromised by these constraints on capital spending.
This manifested in slow or failing equipment, low staﬀ morale and re-
cruitment problems (‘people do not want to work in these buildings’),
excessive travel times and outdated models of care.
Whilst the most commonly cited impacts resulted from lack of
maintenance and renewal of the built environment or lack of invest-
ment in equipment, a minority of respondents also cited IT concerns.
For example, respondents working within mental health cited the po-
tential for serious quality failures in cases where electronic recording
systems were unaligned across inpatient and community settings. One
respondent referred to a building as being an ‘enormous ﬁre risk’ and
described relying on regulatory bodies' reluctance to close down med-
ical facilities.
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The biggest issue is patient care in our A&E departments, where – if you
are going to look at the guidelines - we need much bigger A&E space.
There isn't the space to care for patients, and because of that, patients are
in corridors frequently … It is not ideal, we are doing our best to make
sure the patients are safe, but that is the impact. And that needs some
money spent on it, in terms of changing A&E, which we don't have.
(Interviewee 26, Acute FT)
Of the 30 interviewees, 25 reported needing to prioritise and/or
ration capital spending. The most frequently cited examples related to
equipment and buildings. This took the form of, for example, delays to
building renovations and repairs, and postponing of equipment re-
placement. In the area of IT, examples included inability to invest in
appointment scheduling systems and other information platforms.
As we strive to try and achieve ﬁnancial balance and sustainability,
obviously that will then just starve the capital programme, and [we are]
really having to take some very tight decisions in what we invest our
money in. (Interviewee 13, Mental Health Trust CFO)
My immediate backlog maintenance for the high and signiﬁcant risks are
higher than £1 million, but if I just tackle them I'm still not going to have
a ﬁt for purpose estate because just tackling the high and signiﬁcant risk
items doesn't do other things like, you know, windows that are rotten and
roofs that are starting to … It feels like you're constantly playing catch-
up. (Interviewee 30, Ambulance Trust Estates Director)
Of the ﬁve interviewees that felt their organisations had not yet
reached the stage of priority setting and/or rationing, two predicted
that they would do so within two-three years. The others highlighted
the importance of having been able to maintain a ﬁnancial surplus and
therefore to apply successfully for loans to fund their capital plans.
5.3. The seven forms of rationing
The most frequently cited priority setting and rationing practices
corresponded to the categories of dilution, delay and selection from the
forms of rationing framework (Fig. 1). For example, interviewees de-
scribed using depreciation budgets linked to capital assets as a source of
savings, thereby diluting the eﬃcacy of equipment and weakening the
therapeutic environment.
The quality of the facilities for the services deteriorates over time. We
don't need to build luxury hotels but we do need places that are conducive
to making people feel well and good about themselves. And when people
aren't feeling well, to go into something that looks a bit tatty and a bit
careworn is not helpful I think. (Interviewee 9, Acute FT CFO)
Many respondents reported delaying capital projects, with large-
scale transformation plans particularly vulnerable. Interviewees also
identiﬁed delay as a strategy of national bodies who were perceived as
being unable to meet requests for capital investment funds. Delays in
responding to these requests were seen as a cause of postponements –
sometimes indeﬁnitely - to local capital projects. These, it was claimed,
were passed onto patients in the form of longer waiting times for
consultations and tests.
Our interviews suggested that instances of explicit denial were
comparatively rare, although dependence on inaccessible funds made
some schemes practically impossible. More commonly, respondents
described processes of selection between investment options, with de-
lays (rather than denial) applied to those not selected. Whilst some
described these decision-making processes as reactive and ad hoc,
others referred to formalised processes and criteria for deciding be-
tween options for capital investment.
We have for the last three years been having to identify our core capital
requirements. We can't actually aﬀord to replace everything that needs
replacing when it's due to be replaced and so we've had to go through a
prioritisation process each year and we've done a risk assessment and
rag-rated them. (Interviewee 17, Acute FT OD)
Responsibility for priority setting was typically assigned to com-
mittees (either temporary or permanent) who conducted appraisals
based on business cases, and then fed decisions into the organisational
planning process. These bodies were all internally appointed and sat
within the organisational structure, albeit with varying relationships to
their executive boards and therefore varying levels of decision-making
power. The study did not uncover use of any other tools or frameworks,
and many respondents cited the diﬃculties of comparing disparate in-
vestment options (e.g. ‘car parks and scanners’). In recognition of this
incommensurability, some had formally subdivided their capital budget
between physical services, IT, major and minor equipment, and
prioritised within, rather than between, these categories.
For organisations facing acute ﬁnancial constraint (the majority of
those in the sample), patient safety and protection of service viability
were cited as the most inﬂuential criteria, with considerations of eﬃ-
ciency, service improvement, strategic partnerships and reducing in-
equalities, considered secondary.
We go through a prioritisation process … so we're moving stuﬀ further
down the line and prioritising on safety and quality. We do have other
things in the decision making process i.e. does it generate income, does it
deliver CI [cost improvement], etc. But when our safety and quality is a
priority, it means those other schemes are going to the back and because
we haven't got any money to even do all the safety and quality ones
they're not getting done. (Interviewee 15, Partnership Trust CFO)
Some respondents also cited the challenge posed by vested interests,
and there was concern that decision-making overall could be more
Fig. 1. Forms of rationing in capital expenditure.
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robust. These concerns were notably prominent among the small
number of non-ﬁnance respondents.
It would be fair to say that we have struggled with trying to get an honest
appraisal. Clinicians sometimes aren't the best at being balanced about
what they need rather than what they want. (Interviewee 29, Acute FT
OD)
We tend to make incremental decisions about our estate without thinking
what does a ﬁve to ten-year plan, or even a 25-year plan, need to look
like? … I think we probably lack capacity and capability to steer the
planning around that. (Interviewee 22, Partnership FT OD)
Respondents considered termination of services to be rare, citing
disincentives deriving both from payment systems (‘your cost base goes
up and your income goes down’), and public attitudes (‘it's more trouble
than it's worth most of the time’). As well as being politically hazardous,
termination was described, perhaps paradoxically, as resource in-
tensive, with programmes of service rationalisation often not im-
plemented due to short-term pressures on capital budgets.
Although respondents did not report using deterrence as a rationing
strategy, there was a widely shared perception that changes to national
arrangements for accessing capital funds were intended to deter
funding applications. These included, for example, new/additional de-
mands for capital programme business cases and extended timelines for
their approval or rejection. One respondent, for example described
these as a ‘deliberate attempt to try and manage the cash position of the
Department of Health.’
There were no obvious activities described by interviewees for de-
ﬂecting demand for capital. However, this strategy was again attributed
to national bodies who were seen as seeking to deﬂect capital ex-
penditure plans away from the NHS ‘balance sheet’ and towards the
private sector, in order to stay within their own budget allocation:
It is madness really. The government can borrow at historically low levels
but is forcing people down the more expensive private route just to keep it
oﬀ the books. (Interviewee 7, Acute FT CFO)
6. Discussion and conclusions
Almost all of the interviewees indicated that they were operating in
a context of severe constraint. Although some identiﬁed other con-
tributors to these problems – including the rapid pace of technological
and demographic change and shortages of analytical and planning
capability – the primary driver was consistently cited as being the
‘starving’ of funds for capital projects. Our examination of negative
cases (i.e. those not reporting these diﬃculties) appears to reinforce the
central message that funding shortages were a key factor in the pro-
blems experienced. In each example, respondents attributed their
ability to secure funds for capital projects to their preceding ﬁnancial
good health.
6.1. Priority setting and rationing?
Although most organisations had sought alternative means for
raising capital funds, they nevertheless acknowledged the increasing
need to ration expenditure. In this respect, the data warrants compar-
ison with the wider literature on priority setting and rationing of health
care services. For example, the relative prevalence of delay and dilution
appears to reﬂect approaches long since observed elsewhere (Klein
et al., 1996), as does the tendency to avoid explicit denial and/or ter-
mination (Robert et al., 2014; Rooshenas et al., 2015). However, some
diﬀerences were also observable. For example, descriptions of capital
resource allocation departed from much of the wider rationing litera-
ture inasmuch as they rarely evoked individualised narratives of the
patient encounter (with the partial exception of equipment). There was
also little reference made, either rhetorical or substantive, to patient
involvement in decision-making processes (Daniels et al., 2018).
However, these ﬁndings may be a consequence of the narrow re-
spondent sample rather than an inherent characteristic of capital re-
source allocation.
Although our respondents did allude to some professional and
public resistance to capital investment decisions, this appeared to be of
a lesser magnitude than is reported in other areas of health care
spending. In turn, this appears to suggest a lack of proﬁle vis a vis these
other areas, which may result in capital being somewhat disadvantaged
in the overall resource allocation process. As something of a neglected
area of health care investment (and disinvestment), the risk is that
deterioration in capital infrastructure continues for longer before visi-
bility demands a response. This relative lack of proﬁle may explain why
some responding organisations were apparently able to adopt an ex-
plicit approach to selection, which has proven to be highly contentious
in the prioritisation of clinical and therapeutic services (Robinson et al.,
2011).
An area of similarity with the extant rationing literature was the
apparent reliance on the ‘business case’ model of priority setting
(Robinson et al., 2012). This is perhaps understandable given the
under-developed nature of prioritisation methods for capital spending;
whilst ‘capital-friendly’ measurement tools in areas of buildings and
construction exist, they are narrow in scope and somewhat untested
(e.g. Ali and Hegazy, 2013; Shohet, 2003). There are exceptions, no-
tably in relation to equipment where speciﬁc frameworks to support
prioritisation have been developed (see for example Diaconu et al.,
2017; Ivlev et al., 2014). However, there appeared to be additional
obstacles to priority setting for our respondents, including the sheer
range and variety of capital investment options, containing degrees of
incommensurability far beyond those of more mainstream priority
setting. They also include the uncertainty and complexity character-
ising the relationship between investments and (health) outcomes.
Respondents were forced to make decisions based on, at best, highly
disaggregated and heterogeneous costs, and poorly understood risks
and beneﬁts. It was notable that some respondents had separated ca-
pital budgets into sub-units (equipment, IT, buildings) before engaging
in option appraisal, and others sought technical expertise drawn from
outside of their organisations when weighing up capital investment
options (Edwards, 2017).
We set out to examine the role of priority setting in decisions over
the allocation of scarce capital resources and, in this respect, our
ﬁndings have some important implications. Whilst our respondents
conﬁrmed the importance of adopting formal priority setting, none
believed that this alone would alleviate the problems they faced.
Respondents were most concerned with the overall quantum of avail-
able capital resources, and saw a simple increase in this as being the
single most important requirement for improvement. Allied to this, the
NHS funding regime not only placed additional constraints on capital
spending, but was also seen as damaging to local decision-making. A
common complaint, for example, related to how national budgets were
superintended. Many respondents had experienced uncertainty and
delay when applying for funds, and this foreshortened their planning
horizons in a way inconsistent with priority setting. Some reported
failing to secure approval for plans even where the necessary funds
were internally available. As well as these direct constraints on their
autonomy, national expenditure targets were widely perceived to have
impeded local decision-making, as all other concerns were apparently
overridden by the imperative to keep major disbursements oﬀ the NHS
‘balance sheet’. This had also resulted in forms of opportunism in the
search for funding which further distorted local priorities – for example
deﬂecting organisations towards non-urgent capital schemes for which
resources (e.g. charitable) were more readily available.
The combined eﬀect of these formal strictures and indirect con-
straints was to diminish the autonomy and control required to imple-
ment any priority setting model or process. In these circumstances, it is
perhaps unsurprising that rationing was preferred to priority setting as
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the dominant response to scarcity.
6.2. Forms of rationing revisited
As noted, our study appears to conﬁrm the relative dominance of
dilution and delay as mechanisms of rationing, and of selection rather
than denial and termination as the preferred approach to priority setting.
The FoR model appears to function well in this context in that each of
its priority setting/rationing forms was present in the study, albeit these
were distributed across local and national actors. Our respondents, for
example, ascribed motives of deterrence, deﬂection and delay to na-
tional bodies, and cast themselves as the recipients of the resulting
harms. To increase critical purchase, our study therefore suggests that
when used to analyse capital budget ﬂows, the FoR model could be
simultaneously applied to multiple, interconnecting tiers of decision-
making.
It seems likely that the FoR model (as encapsulated in Fig. 1) can be
adapted and applied to other areas of priority setting and rationing in
health. However, the brevity and heterogeneity that characterises de-
scription of the various rationing forms hinders analysis of relationships
with, for example, system contexts, and decision outcomes. We there-
fore believe that observing and recording patterns in the distribution of
rationing forms across decision-making tiers may ultimately help to
build explanatory models and hypotheses for future empirical testing.
6.3. Limitations and future research
In these ways, we believe this study makes an important contribu-
tion to the ongoing theorisation of how rationing unfolds in practice,
especially in the neglected ﬁeld of capital investment. We believe there
is value in further application of the forms of rationing model to aid
classiﬁcation and analysis of rationing forms, not just in the arena of
capital spending. Given its eﬃcacy in capturing the range of forms in
this study, and its wider salience, we propose the following:
1. That the descriptors of the rationing forms be standardised but also
variegated according to the tier or level of actor under analysis
(Table 1 provides a starting point for this).
2. That the prevalence of each form be tracked, through review of
previous research and in attempts to prospectively identify and
analyse rationing behaviours in health care.
3. That these behaviours are mapped against wider organisational and
system characteristics to enable development of hypotheses as to the
presence of the various rationing forms according to observable
system features.
4. That attempts are made to connect these conﬁgurations to wider
theoretical explanations of decision-making and resource allocation
in health care systems.
Priority setting and rationing of capital resources in health care is an
under-researched topic and the results of this exploratory study, whilst
not deﬁnitive, suggest some important lines of future empirical research
and theoretical development, as well as pointing to issues of some ur-
gency and importance for health care systems. Although our data derive
predominantly from the testimony of senior ﬁnance personnel in the
English NHS, the additional interviews we conducted suggest that dif-
ferent organisational perspectives might enrich understanding. Future
research might also take an ethnographic approach to decision-making,
and to this end we have identiﬁed some of the fora (i.e. capital spending
panels and committees, and the business case model of decision-
making) where this more naturalistic investigation might take place.
This study also suggests that future research into priority setting and
rationing of capital programmes, like all areas of resource allocation
decision-making, requires attention to implementation. Although this
was not discussed in detail by respondents, the importance of im-
plementation in infrastructural change where organisational
determinants are likely to shape outcomes, is arguably more pro-
nounced (Crompton et al., 2017). Similarly, the issue of patient in-
volvement in capital spending decisions was not raised during the
study. However, some of the more intractable problems – such as es-
tablishing the relative beneﬁts of options for improving the built en-
vironment – clearly require a patient perspective for their resolution
(LaVela et al., 2016).
There is a risk of bias deriving from our approach to sampling as
well as the level of self-selection it allowed. It was clear from our initial
invitation that budget ‘constraint’ formed part of the lens through
which we sought to explore the topic, and this may have aﬀected re-
sponse rates. For example, it may have encouraged those experiencing
higher levels of ‘constraint’ to respond, and/or those more willing to
disclose the diﬃculties they were experiencing. The research team's
relative lack of expertise in the intricacies of ﬁnancial management may
also have inﬂuenced the research exchange. During interviews, we were
conscious of respondents seeking to translate technical terms into more
accessible language and, in the process, we may have unconsciously
skewed the interactions and our interpretations of them towards the
less technical themes associated with the topic. Finally, our study
sample is conﬁned primarily to local actors. The absence of a national
respondent group means that we are unable to verify motives and be-
haviours attributed to them during the study.
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